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Abstract: The International experience including Indonesia shows that after privatizing their 
telecommunications, countries employed three new methods of state control: creating a golden share 
mechanism, establishing an independent regulatory body and employing a licensing system. All 
these methods represent the paradigm shift of control from state ownership to state regulatory based 
control. This paper examines Indonesian telecommunications privatization and its implications in 
terms of the meaning of state control under the Indonesian Constitution of 1945. Privatization, with 
various definitions and its rhetoric, opposes state intervention in the economy. Meanwhile, 
telecommunications is a classic example of a strategic sector under direct control of the state. The 
central issue of this paper concerns the methods of state control applied following the privatization 
of telecommunications, the adequacy of these methods and their implications in the context of 
Indonesian legislation stipulating that telecommunications is a strategic sector that should be 
controlled by the state. The ultimate conclusion of the paper is that privatization of 
telecommunications is not intended to remove state control, but rather change the manner from a 
direct into an indirect control – from state ownership to state regulation.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The telecommunications industry has always been given special treatment because of its great importance to 
society (Melody, 2001). In Canada, for example, this industry has legally been recognized for its significant role in 
the maintenance of Canada’s identity and sovereignty. Traditionally, therefore, the telecommunications industry 
has been state-owned and subject to a complete monopoly, leaving the government with full control over this 
sector (Zhao, 1999). The Indonesian Telecommunications Act stipulates that the telecommunications sector is of 
national strategic importance and must therefore be controlled by the state. This provision is basically derived 
from Article 33 (2) of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945, which states: “Sectors of production that are important 
for the country and affect the life of the people shall be controlled by the state”. This constitutional provision - 
particularly the words “shall be controlled by State” (state control) - indicates that Indonesia is properly 
characterized as an interventionist state. In other words, this is a constitutional justification for state intervention 
over strategic sector such as telecommunications.  
Since the late 1980s, there has been a radical policy reversal whereby governments have progressively 
reduced their ownership and involvement in this sector by increasing private sector participation. Advances in 
telecommunications technology, the inefficiency of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the changing market 
structure of the telecommunications industries are commonly seen as the three most important factors behind the 
movement (Wallstein, 1999). One country after another, including Indonesia, has reformed their 
telecommunications industry by privatizing this sector, as well as introducing other reforms (Cho and Lee, 1997).  
As discussed by Noll (1999) and Wallsten (1999), privatization of the telecommunications sector signals a 
dramatic shift from state-dominated institutions to market institutions in many countries. The main aim is to 
dismantle a monopoly and to enhance competition over the sector by allowing private participation. One of the 
important implications of this is that governments become less able to carry out direct political control over the 
sector.  
The privatization of the Indonesian telecommunications industry, therefore, raises a critical question; in 
what ways might the government maintain its control over the sector when privatization reduces state ownership in 
SOEs? This paper examines the privatization of the Indonesian telecommunications industry and its implication 
for the notion of state control over the sector. More specifically, it examines the method of state control after 
privatization of the Indonesian telecommunications     industry. Finally, the paper will conclude by articulating 
new meanings of state control and advocate that Indonesia should give greater consideration to these post-
privatization state controls. 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology   Vol. 5, Issue 2 (2010)  
59 
 
2. The Meaning of Privatization 
 
Privatization has become an icon of economic and political reform in both developed and developing countries 
(Hanke, 1987). In other words, the phenomenon of privatization is now truly global in nature (Moe, 1987). 
However, writers and researchers believe that the term and concept are still in need of academic refinement. They 
complain that the term privatization is indeed very omnibus and its concept is imprecise (Ghosh, 2000). In the 
words of Starr (1998), “privatization covers a great range of ideas and policies, varying from the eminently 
reasonable to the wildly impractical”.  
The ideological underpinning of privatization is based on minimum state intervention in economic and 
public affairs. This idea is built on the notion that state intervention produces inefficiency, and that furthermore, 
state intervention leads to decisions that are mostly politically motivated and either ignore or override factors 
which markets would recognize. It should, therefore, be minimized. It also believes that government, as Peter 
Drucker (1992) put it, is “a poor manager”. Privatization, therefore, is intended to be an economic tool to solve 
this economic inefficiency.  
Privatization is both an economic and political concept. Hence, privatization is actually a matter of the 
political economy. The political economy is concerned with the distribution of economic resources and products 
for both the people and the state (the sovereign). In other words, the purpose of the political economy is to 
guarantee the development of both the state and individuals in a proper, safe and fair way. Either the private or 
public sector, or a mixture of the two, can carry out the distribution. In this context, privatization and 
governmentalisation are viewed as two opposing extremes.  
If the government chooses to have a more direct influence in business, it will direct companies to the 
government extreme. On the other hand, if it prefers to allow the private sector to play a greater role, the tendency 
will be toward privatization (Bastian, 1998). Privatization, therefore, pertains to the policy regarding the level of 
state intervention in the economy. Thus, privatization involves change only in the form of the state’s economic 
role, rather the role itself. In other words, privatization is a policy of changing, not removing the state intervention 
in the economy. Privatization may reduce the state’s ownership but at the same time increases the state regulatory 
function in the economy. 
3. Traditional Telecommunications Regimes 
3.1. Public and Private Monopoly 
 
Telecommunications has been in state hands since the dawn of the electronics era in most developed countries, as 
well as in virtually all developing nations (Bortolotti et al, 2001). It was generally combined with postal services 
and, in most European countries, was provided within the framework of the national Post, Telegraph and 
Telephone Administration (the PTT model). This regime has traditionally been characterized by a high degree of 
government intervention (Klodt, 1997).  State institutions such as ministries of post and communications 
controlled the PTT, holding monopoly over all mail and telecommunications services (Hulsink, 1999).  
The classic argument dictating that the provision of these services should be reserved to a particular 
enterprise controlled by the state was that these were strategic industries, and that specific security concerns were 
involved. In addition, there are three main reasons justifying telecommunications monopolies. First, an economic 
argument has been put forth which states that telecommunications is a typical ‘natural monopoly’. It was argued 
that the establishment of telecommunications networks involved large fixed costs1 and that a single enterprise 
would therefore be able to provide services at lower costs than would two or more different enterprises (Geradin 
and Kerf, 2003).  
Secondly, telecommunications is a public utility - a service that is essential to the public, such as water, 
electricity and postal services, usually involving elements of natural monopoly. Thirdly, some have argued that 
network externalities justified organizing the telecommunications sector on a monopoly basis. Network 
externalities are present in the area of telecommunications since the value of a network increases, for each user, 
with the number of network subscribers. As a result, for a given total number of subscribers, the value of a single 
network is much greater than the total value of several smaller unconnected networks (Geradin and Kerf, 2003). 
                                                          
1
 The installation of cables, microwave transmitters, and switches is capital intensive, so this activity involves significant economics of 
scale. The large fixed cost discourages market entry, but once the network of lines and cables had been laid out, marginal cost declines 
rapidly. A single telephone cable provides all the telecommunications capacity demanded by most households and business. Therefore, 
it seems wasteful to have more than one network to serve consumers.  
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The major visible exception to these observations has been the case of the United States (US), where 
telecommunications was considered as a service to be supplied by private business in normal markets (Drake, 
2001). Interestingly, however, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T), a private 
telecommunication company, dominated the provision of telecommunications services (Hudson, 1997).  The 
author argues, therefore, that both Europe and the United States essentially adopted the monopoly model in 
different forms; public monopoly and private monopoly respectively.  
3.2. The PTT: An Etatist Telecommunications Regime 
 
In most European countries the operation of the telecommunications system was exclusively assigned to a 
government department or a public enterprise, generally known as the PTT model, with responsibility for the 
postal, telegraph and telephone monopolies. These PTTs were part of the traditional public administration 
apparatus and as such were subject to strong government influence and regulation through the polity (Noam, 
1992). The telecommunications administration of European colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 
generally were branches or affiliates of the European PTTs (Drake, 1999). What all this means is that the 
European PTTs have provided the dominant model applied in most countries in the world, and that it became the 
most representative model for the traditional telecommunications regime. 
The PTT regime did not emerge overnight, but was the result of centuries of struggle (Noam, 1992).   
Indeed, historical investigation reveals that the regime was derived from the postal monopoly system implemented 
by European emperors since the 15th century (Noam, 1992). The nuances of absolutism of the imperial system 
were transformed into the PTT regime in the form of state monopolies over the telecommunications sector.  In the 
words of Noam (1992), “the PTT regime was born as a creation by the absolutist state for the absolutist state”. 
During its development the nuances of absolutism within the regime were rationalized through more 
democratic idioms such as national sovereignty or national interests. An economic argument that considered 
telecommunications as a typical natural monopoly also contributed to the establishment of the regime. In other 
words, absolutism and natural monopoly provided the political and economic underpinnings for the establishment 
of the PTT regime.  
These arguments justified the operation of PTTs as monopolistic telecommunications enterprises owned, 
operated and regulated by the government. These determined the typical role of government in the sector - playing 
a tripartite role as owner, operator and regulator of telecommunications. More specifically, this took the form of 
monopoly rights, a lack of an independent regulatory body and state ownership. These were common 
characteristics of the regime able to be observed in both developed and developing countries. 
The PTT’s anti-competition policy maintained an extensive monopoly over nearly all networks, equipment 
and services. The lack of an independent regulatory body is a direct consequence of the government’s positions as 
both owner of the operator and its primary regulator. State ownership is the most distinctive character of the PTT 
regime, which mostly takes the form of the establishment of a State Owned Telecommunications Enterprise 
(SOTE). The argument is that only by possessing the majority share of a SOTE will a state be able to protect the 
sector from possible economic, political or legal action that may cause harm to the national economy and security. 
As a result, private ownership including foreign ownership is restricted or even prohibited under the regime. To 
sum up, all of the above characteristics lead the PTT to appear as typical of the etatist telecommunications regime. 
4. Telecommunications Reform 
 
The present wave of telecommunications reforms now sweeping the globe began in the 1980s (Pisciotta, 2001). 
This is a response to the traditional protectionist-etatist regime, which is essentially aiming at the liberalization of 
the sector. Here, liberalization is defined as de-monopolization of states over the telecommunications sector, or in 
the words of Hills (1989), “…is a transfer of markets from a system based on rules made by governments to one 
based on competition between private entities”. In other words, the telecommunications reform movement aims at 
freeing the telecommunications sector from state monopoly, by moving it towards market forces, decentralization, 
deregulation, privatization and competition.  
The rationales of telecommunications reforms differ across countries, but can be broadly grouped as follows: 
ideology, debt crises and global recession, technological revolution, under-performance of the sector, and 
participation in multilateral trading system. The combination of these factors resulted in support for a new 
approach to the telecommunications sector.  It was increasingly believed that telecommunications services would 
be supplied in a better, more efficient manner if the markets were opened up to competition and were privatized 
SOEs (Ospina, 2002). This constituted precisely the main objective of the reforms - the dismantling of the state’s 
monopoly production of telecommunications services.
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5. Privatization of Telecommunications: A Review of International Experience 
 
In reviewing the experience of telecommunications privatization, case studies will be outlined for the United 
Kingdom (UK) as an example of a developed country, and Malaysia as an example of a developing country. The 
UK privatization telecommunications program served as a pioneer and has been widely recognized as an important 
reference for both developed and developing countries undertaking such programs. Malaysia was the first 
Southeast Asian country to privatize its telecommunications sector and as Petrazzini (1995) observed, it possessed 
a successfully privatized and liberalized telecommunications sector. In view of this, Malaysia’s experience is 
likely to be important for Indonesia both as a developing country and because of its geographical proximity. 
Valuable lessons for the Indonesian privatization process may possibly be learnt from that experience. 
5.1. The United Kingdom 
 
The provision of telecommunications services within the UK started at about the same time as the invention of the 
telephone itself in 1876 and was largely linked to the General Post Office (GPO), the oldest public monopoly in 
the UK (Vogel, 1996 and Vogelsang & Mithcell, 1997). This integrated telecommunications services under the 
responsibility of the GPO made its monopoly position more powerful (Al-Shurman, 2001). This monopoly 
structure followed the typical European model - the PTT model.   
Researchers have used different perspectives to identify the main motives and objectives of the UK’s 
privatization program. These range from short term budgetary goals concerning the form of pressure for reduced 
public sector borrowings, to a political theme of widening share ownership. The author, however, agrees with 
Kirkpatrick (1988) who concluded that both political ideology and pragmatism have been the main drivers of the 
UK privatization program.  
The process of privatizing and liberalizing the entire telecommunications industry within the UK involved 
three phases.  The first started with the separation of telecommunications services from the Post Office, which was 
effected by the 1981 British Telecommunications Act.  The Act paved the way for further liberalization of the 
industry.  The second phase started in 1984 with the introduction of the 1984 British Telecommunications Act, 
which laid down the process of selling British Telecom (BT). The third phase was the post-privatization period 
where a new regulatory framework for the industry was established by the Act. This was embodied in the Office of 
Telecommunications (OFTEL). After about twenty years of carrying out its function as the UK’s 
telecommunications regulator, OFTEL ceased its function in December 2003 and was replaced by a new body 
called “OFCOM” (Office of Communications). 
The main point to note here is that the privatization of BT has introduced a new relationship between 
government and telecommunications operators. Privatization created a new stakeholder in the telecommunications 
sector: the private shareholder. As a result, governments were no longer the sole owner of the telecommunications 
operators. Before privatization, governments could easily exert pressure on telecommunications operators through 
the simple reason that they owned them. This practice became difficult or even impossible after privatization. The 
UK’s experience reveals that privatization has directed the focus of the government’s role to that of a regulator, 
with governments aligning the idea of telecommunications companies to both private shareholders and citizens in 
the community. 
In addition, for the purpose of protecting national interests the British government established golden 
shares in its privatized companies. Unlike conventional shares, which strongly represent the commercial motives 
of the shareholders (control-based ownership), the government has created golden shares primarily for policy 
objectives (control-based regulation). Through the possession of the golden share, the government apparently put 
emphasis on making policies (in the form of certain special rights), and not on holding equity to protect its national 
interests in privatized companies. In the case of British Telecom (BT) the reason was the protection of “national 
interests” and “stability” for UK citizens (Seven, 2002). 
5.2. Malaysia 
 
As a former British colony, Malaysia’s telecommunications applied the PTT model – a typical model for most 
former European colonies. Like most developing countries, pragmatic and economic considerations were the main 
motives behind Malaysia’s privatization program. However, Malaysia’s privatization program was a unique one, 
as it also was driven by a clear ideological foundation not shared by many developing countries. In this regard, 
Petrazzini (1995) pointed out that Mahathir Mohammad who came into power in 1981 and introduced the idea of 
privatization borrowed a philosophy and a considerable number of ideas and strategies for state reform from the 
UK.  Aside from pragmatic and ideological motives, the government sought to increase the participation of the 
indigenous community (or “Bumiputeras”) in mainstream economic activities (Dewenter and Malatesta, 1996).  
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Like the UK, although the resemblance is not complete, the entire process of Malaysia’s privatization 
telecommunications involved three steps. The first was a limited liberalization of the sector. The second was the 
partial privatization of JTM (Jabatan Telekom Malaysia, a government department under the Ministry of Works, 
Telecommunications and Post), and the third was a liberalization of post-JTM privatization.   
The limited liberalization was mainly driven by a shortage of terminal equipment as well as the private 
sector’s ability to convince the government they could remedy the problem. This policy attracted private 
telecommunications firms to enter the market. Several locally-owned as well as foreign companies took advantage 
of the new market environment (Kennedy, 1993). Using this momentum, within two years, liberalization was 
extended to other telecommunications markets such as value-added network services/VANs (1984), radio paging 
(1985), and mobile cellular services (1988). This further liberalization was driven by among other things, JTM’s 
inability to devote sufficient physical or management resources to the development of value-added services (Lee, 
2004).  
In January 1987, the operation of Malaysia’s telecommunication services was transferred from JTM to 
Syarikat Telekom Malaysia Berhad or Telekom Malaysia (TM).  Subsequently, the government sold 25 per cent of 
TM’s equity to the public via a public listing exercise in 1990 and TM became Telekom Malaysia Berhad or TMB 
(Petrazzini, 1995). To date, the government continues to own more than 60 per cent of TMB’s equity through 
various agencies.2 In addition, the government owns a single unit “golden share”. This concept, operates in 
principle as an entrenched provision allowing the holder powers of veto over fundamental decisions of the 
company  irrespective of the special shareholder’s ordinary shareholding. This arrangement was common amongst 
other major Malaysian privatized utilities, for example, Malaysia Airlines (MAS) and Tenaga Nasional Berhad, 
the incumbent power utility(Lee, 2004). 
Liberalization in the post–privatization era mainly took the form of entry into major markets, fixed line and 
cellular services. The issuance of five additional licenses between 1993 and 1995 to compete with the incumbent 
TMB indicated further liberalization in the fixed line market services.3 In addition, four licenses had been issued 
for cellular service operators.4 Another important telecommunications market liberalized was that of the Internet 
Service Provider (ISP).  After partial privatization of JTM, seven additional licenses were issued to the other major 
firms in the sector (Lee, 2004).5  
Unlike the UK, where the government regulatory function was handed over to OFTEL following the 
privatization of BT in 1984, the JTM remained as regulator of Malaysia’s telecommunications. However, at the 
end of 1998 the government took a clearer position on the state’s post-privatization involvement in the 
telecommunications sector by establishing Communications and Multimedia Commission (CMC) separate from 
the government department.6  
5.3. Key Characteristics of International Telecommunications Privatization:  Some   Lessons for 
Indonesia. 
 
Privatization of telecommunications has been a global phenomenon and both developed and developing countries 
have initiated such a program. Countries have taken different approaches due to economic, social, political and 
legal differences.  The preceding discussion, however, reveals two main characteristics of telecommunications 
privatization that can be observed internationally. First, privatization is intended as a policy reversal to the etatist 
traditional telecommunications regime, which is primarily based on state ownership and state monopoly. For this 
reason, it generally takes the form of reducing state ownership in State-Owned Telecommunications Enterprises 
(SOTEs) and the de-monopolization of the state’s involvement in the sector. Secondly, privatization entails new 
methods of state control (state intervention) in the telecommunications sector.  
 
 
                                                          
2
 The shareholding structure of TMB as of 31 January 2006 is as follows: Khazanah Nasional Berhad (35.12 per cent), Employees 
Provident Fund Board (14.12 per cent), Bank Negara Malaysia (7.42 per cent) and Permodalan Nasional Berhad (5.68 per cent). For 
detail see http://www.telekom.com.my/about_TM/corporate/about_IR_share.htm. Retrieved February 28, 2006. 
3
 Maxis Communications Sdn Bhd  (1993), TIME dot Com Bhd (1994),  PrismaNet (M) Sdn Bhd (1994), DiGi 
Telecommunications Bhd (1995), Celcom (M) Sdn Bhd (1994). 
4
 Celcom (M) Sdn Bhd (1989), Maxis Communications Sdn Bhd (1993 ), DiGi Telecommunications Bhd (1994), TIME dotCOM Bhd 
(1993). 
5
 TM Net, Maxis, Time, Celcom, PrismaNet, Digi, and NTT MSC.  
6
 See Suruhanjaya Komunikasi dan Multimedia Malaysia (SKMM), available at http://www.cmc.gov.my/about_us/history.asp. 
Retrieved March 30, 2006.  
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6. Privatization and the Meaning of “State Control”. 
 
Privatization, for the many definitions and rhetoric associated with it, entails changing the nature of state 
intervention in the economy. In the Indonesian context it relates, among other things, to the issue of state control 
over strategic economic sectors such as telecommunications. Article 4 (1) of the Telecommunications Act 1999 
states: “Telecommunications is controlled by the state under the guidance of the government”. This provision is 
obviously a material elaboration of Article 33 (2) of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 (henceforth referred to as 
the Constitution of 1945), that provides: 
 
“Sectors of production that are important for the country and affect the life of the people shall be 
controlled by the state”. (Emphasis added). 
 
The notion of state control, its history and ideology pertain to the state’s (government) intervention or its 
role in the economy, particularly in relation to the strategic economic sectors. In its development it has become a 
controversial term as it has been subjected to different approaches and applications. Historical investigation 
reveals that ‘state control’ is a legal term that justifies state intervention in the economy.  This finding, however, 
leaves a question: how does the state intervene in the economy? The contextual approach concludes that the notion 
of state control essentially refers to the authority of the state to utilize strategic economic sectors for the greatest 
benefit of most people. The constitution does not specify a specific means of control.  
The government appears to follow this approach. The author has observed that the government’s approach 
appears to indicate a dynamic interpretation as the government tries to ensure the term’s relevance in dealing with 
contemporary issues in the global economy. However, this risks ‘state control’ becoming a mere “rubber stamp” 
rather than a “constitutional provision” used as the guiding force behind the legislation. This is then exacerbated 
by the absence of any authoritative forums for judicial review of whether legislation complies with the 
constitutional provision. The uncertainty of the meaning of the term “state control” will lead to a privatization 
program free to proceed arbitrarily, while at the same time the term may be used as a legal weapon to decry 
privatization as contravening the Constitution of 1945. 
The establishment of the Indonesian Constitutional Court has ended this controversy, which among other 
functions has the task of reviewing whether an act contravenes the Constitution.7  In its judicial review of the 
Mining and Electricity act,8 the Constitutional Court contended that the term “state control” is a concept of public 
law that derives from the principle of sovereignty of the people. Under this concept, the term state control is 
actually an instrument for the state to achieve general welfare. In other words, the forms of state control may vary 
and change but the purposes do not. The Court, therefore, does not reject a narrow meaning of the term that is 
limited to state ownership or regulation. However, at the same time, the Court also insists that this is one 
interpretation, but by no means the only one.9  
The author agrees with the Court’s opinion. The Court has combined both historical and contextual 
approaches, and in doing this, has been able to minimize the risk that an interpretation will be trapped by the past 
or plunged into an arbitrarily contemporary approach. The Court has successfully discovered the actual intention 
of the constitution. The author, therefore, is of the opinion that the term state control should be understood as a 
constitutional mandate to the state to make economic policies with the main purpose of utilizing the strategic 
economic sectors for the greatest benefit of the people. The state has the right to choose the appropriate means of 
control for achieving such a purpose. In this context, the privatization program is not only constitutionally 
acceptable but also is a method of control, which the government believes is able to respond to socio-economic 
development at both national and international level.  
7. Privatization of the Indonesian Telecommunications Industry 
7.1. Pre-privatization Regime 
 
Indonesia was a Dutch colony. Following its independence in 1945, the country inherited many Dutch laws 
including the Telecommunications Law. Subsequently, Indonesia took over the Dutch Post, Telephone and 
Telegraph Service (PTT) and became the Indonesian PTT Service - the government agency for the provision of 
                                                          
7
 See Article 24 ( c ) of the Constitution 1945. 
8
 Judgement of the Indonesian Constitutional Court No. 002/PUU-I/2003 and No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003. 
9
 Judgement of the Indonesian Constitutional Court  No. 002/PUU-I/2003, p 108 and KMK No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003, p 333. 
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post and telecommunications services (Misdiyono, et al, 2000). The country also continued to employ the 
European PTT regime, a system that had been used by the Dutch colonial government in Indonesia since 1931.  
The government enacted Act No. 5/1964 on Telecommunications, which constituted the first 
Telecommunications Law established after independence. The Act provided a legal framework for the operation of 
telecommunications, which among other things stipulated that telecommunications was a strategic sector with 
economic, political and military importance; hence all operations and services were to be provided solely by the 
state.  To this end, the government established PN. Postel as the sole operator of telecommunications 
(Depparpostel, 1989).  
To improve service provision, the government decided in 1965 to separate posts and telecommunications 
services and organized these under two different companies: PN. Pos dan Giro and PN. Telekomunikasi 
respectively (Sugondo and Bhinekawati, 2004). Ten years later, through the issuance of government regulation 
No.36/1974, the government transformed PN. Telekomunikasi into a new form of SOE – Perumtel. This company 
was established with mixed responsibilities, both for providing public services as well as making profits. In its 
operation, the government granted Perumtel an exclusive right to provide telecommunications services throughout 
the country. The government transferred Perumtel in 1991 into a limited liability company – PT. Telkom, with the 
government as the sole owner of the shares of the company.  
The state’s monopoly over the sector was more vigorous when the government in 1980 established another 
state-owned telecommunications enterprise – PT. Indosat, which was responsible for the provision of international 
telecommunications (Sugondo and Bhinekawati, 2004). This company was previously a subsidiary of ITT 
(International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation), an American telecommunications company, which had 
operated in Indonesia since 1967 following the enactment of the Foreign Investment Law (Act No.1/1967). The 
government took over PT. Indosat in December 1980 through an acquisition and after this point wholly owned the 
company’s shares (BPAB, 2003). Following the establishment of PT. Indosat, there was a separation of 
international and national telecommunications services: PT. Indosat became the sole provider of international 
services, and PT. Telkom became the monopoly supplier of domestic services (Sugondo and Bhinekawati, 2004). 
As can be seen, the Indonesian telecommunications pre-privatization regime relied on the concept of state 
ownership, mainly taking the form of the establishment of SOEs. Moreover, the SOEs operated under a monopoly 
scheme (duopoly policy), which was not open for private sector participation. 
Four main reasons were behind the establishment of this regime. First, the concept of state ownership 
seems to have been intended as a material elaboration of Article 33 (2) of the Constitution of 1945, particularly of 
the term “state control”. Secondly, the Indonesian telecommunications system inherited the Dutch PTT, which was 
a state-based monopoly regime. Thirdly, state monopoly had been a mainstream of world telecommunications 
regimes from the 1900s to the end of 1980s. Most countries, including Indonesia, followed such a regime for their 
telecommunications system. Finally, telecommunications was considered as a strategic sector that should be 
controlled by the state.  
 
7.2. Process of Telecommunications Privatization 
 
The main reasons that urge the Indonesian government to privatize its telecommunications industry were 
pragmatic motive, international pressures, international commitments and improvement of service provision. 
Privatization was seen as the way to resolve the financial crisis faced by the government. In other words, it 
emerged as a major revenue earner. Hence, privatization of telecommunications mainly took the form of selling 
SOEs to one or more private sector firms, particularly foreign investors, because local capital markets had a very 
limited absorption capacity (Latipulhayat, 2006).  
Indonesia’s privatization was also a condition imposed by international lending institutions such as the IMF 
and the World Bank to overcome the financial crisis at the end of 1997. The Indonesian government stated: 
“…among the larger enterprises, the two publicly listed telecommunications enterprises, PT. Telkom and PT. 
Indosat, are strong candidates for further rapid privatization”.10 Privatization of the telecommunications has also 
been part of Indonesia’s commitment to the WTO. The main mission of this organization is liberalizing 
international trade as well as eliminating barriers on global trade and investments (Bobjoseph, 2003). The lack of 
investment was a major problem in achieving the telecommunications target. Privatization is one of the solutions.  
Privatization of the Indonesian telecommunications industry involved both the transfer of activities to 
private hands and the transfer of state ownership (privatization in the broad sense). More specifically, it was 
carried out in two steps: the liberalization of telecommunications and the divestment of SOEs. These steps are 
discussed further below. 
 
                                                          
10
 Letter of Intent of the government of Indonesia with the IMF, January 20, 2000. 
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7.2.1. The Liberalization of Telecommunications 
7.2.1.1. From Duopoly to Private Sector Participation 
 
The enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 198911 marked the liberalization of the Indonesian 
telecommunications industry, as it allowed for the first time participation of private operators in the provision of 
telecommunications services. This included both domestic and, to a more limited extent, foreign investors 
(Sugondo and Bhinekawati, 2004). The provision of most relevance to private sector involvement is Article 12 that 
categorizes telecommunications services into two types: basic services12 that include domestic and international 
telephony, telex, telegram and mobile services, and non-basic services13 such as paging and Internet access. In 
addition, the provision determines that the “operating body” (Badan Penyelenggara - Indonesian) is to be the sole 
operator of both domestic and international telecommunications services.  
For its operation, the government authorized the two state-owned incumbents, PT. Telkom and PT. Indosat 
to be the sole “operating bodies” for the provision of basic services. To this end, the government granted PT. 
Telkom in 1996 two exclusive rights: providing fixed wire line local telephone services until the end of 2010 and 
providing fixed national long-distance telephone services until the end of 2005. Moreover, PT. Indosat received an 
exclusive right to provide international services until the end of 2004. In other words, the provision of basic 
services is the exclusive right of “the operating body” operating under a duopoly scheme.  
However, a third “operating body”, PT. Satelindo, was created in 1994 as a joint venture between the two 
incumbents and a private company (Bimagraha Group), for the provision of international and mobile basic 
services (Sugondo and Bhinekawati, 2004). This meant that PT. Indosat’s monopoly over the international service 
was ended and followed by the establishment of a duopoly scheme in the provision of the service.  
Regarding private sector participation, the Act provided two schemes as shown in table 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
First, there was a limited privatization scheme in which private sector firms were permitted to participate in 
the provision of basic services under cooperative partnership arrangements with the operating body. Private 
participation in the international service market was not permitted.  Secondly, private sector firms could provide 
non-basic services independently but not in conjunction with the operating body.  
In theory, the schemes allow the private sector to provide basic telecommunications services in cooperation 
with either PT. Telkom or PT. Indosat. But in practice, PT. Telkom was so dominant that there was little room for 
the others to maneuver (Sugondo and Bhinekawati, 2004). It was only after the government introduced new 
liberalization measures in 1993 that the private sector started to enjoy the scheme. The government created various 
public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements depending on the services to be provided. For domestic fixed-line 
services, the KSO (Kerjasama Operasi – Joint Operations) scheme was the only option available, while PPP 
structures for the mobile sector could be in the form of either the PBH (pola bagi hasil - a revenue-sharing) 
agreement or a joint-venture company (JVC). 
 
                                                          
11
 This Act revoked the previous Telecommunications Act of 1964.  
12
 Basic services are telecommunications services conveying information in which the content and message of the information sent and 
received is of a purely permanent, neutral and transparent nature with regards to the telecommunications network and facilities used. 
13
 Non-basic services are valued-added services resulted from the use of certain telecommunications tools such as computers in 
processing and storing data and information.  
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7.2.1.2. Open Competition 
 
The government issued the “Blueprint on the Telecommunications Sector Reforms” in 1999. The main objective 
of this strategy was to move telecommunications operations away from the traditional PPP model so that private 
operators were no longer required to cooperate with a state-owned incumbent in all service categories. This reform 
appeared to pave the way for further liberalization of the sector.  More importantly, this was elaborated further in 
the Telecommunications Act of 1999, which revoked the previous telecommunications law, Act No 36/ 1989.  
Under the new Act, the concept of the “operating body” no longer existed, thus ending PT. Telkom’s and PT. 
Indosat’s monopolies in the provision of domestic and international services respectively. In other words, the Act 
marked the beginning of open competition, and ended the state monopoly over the sector. 
Unlike the Telecommunications Act of 1989, which conferred on the two state-owned “operating bodies” 
an exclusive right in the provision of the telecommunications services, the Act of 1999 stipulated that services may 
be provided by a mix of partly privatized state-owned companies, as well as foreign and domestic private 
companies.  
The fixed-line was the first service that was subject to open competition policy. To this end, the 
government launched an early termination policy of the exclusive rights granted to PT. Telkom, PT. Indosat and 
PT. Satelindo in their respective service segments. The exclusive right of PT. Telkom in the provision of local 
telephone services, which was originally to have expired in 2010, was terminated in 2002 (DGPT, 2004). This was 
followed by the issuance of a license to PT. Indosat for the provision of such services. Initially, PT. Indosat was 
allowed to operate only in the metropolitan areas of Jakarta and Surabaya, but its license was extended to cover the 
entire country in 2004.  
In 2003 the government licensed PT. Telkom to provide international services and that move terminated the 
earlier exclusive right of PT. Indosat for the provision of this service, which was to have ended in 2004. In turn, 
PT. Indosat obtained a national long distance license which was previously the exclusive right of PT. Telkom until 
2005 (DGPT, 2004).  In an unprecedented move, the government also agreed to compensate both firms for the loss 
of their monopolies: it promised to pay 478 billion rupiah to PT. Telkom and 178 billion rupiah to PT. Indosat. 
To avoid any potential conflicts of interests in a more competitive environment, the government 
encouraged PT. Telkom and PT. Indosat to eliminate joint shareholding in their subsidiary companies. As a 
response, in 2003 PT. Telkom and PT. Indosat eliminated the cross-shareholding structures in PT. Satelindo and 
several mobile operators through a series of share swaps. Subsequently, PT. Satelindo became a wholly owned 
subsidiary of PT. Indosat (Telkom Annual Report, 2002). In addition, the government licensed new operators, PT. 
Ratelindo (private company) and PT. Batam Bintan Telekomunikasi (private company) for the provision of local 
telephone services. In the cellular services, as of 2003, 3 national operators, Telkomsel, Excelcomindo, and 
Satelindo controlled more than 70 per cent of the market share (DGPT, 2004). As with fixed-line services, the 
government issued new licenses to 5 cellular operators,14 making the market fully competitive.  
7.2.3.The Divestment of SOEs 
 
The partial privatization of the incumbent operators (PT. Telkom and PT. Indosat) began in 1991 with the 
transformation of the domestic carrier, Perumtel (public corporation), into a state-owned limited liability 
corporation with a commercial purpose, named PT. Telkom. A gradual privatization process then ensued, with 
shares of both PT. Telkom and PT. Indosat being made available on stock exchanges. The main aim was to 
improve telecommunications facilities and to reduce the State budget deficit (Sugondo and Bhinekawati, 2004).  
To accomplish these objectives, the government decided to divest PT. Indosat in 1994 by selling 35 per 
cent of its shares through a dual listing of which 25 per cent were sold on the New York Stock Exchange and 
another 10 per cent on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (Indosat Annual Report, 2001). For a similar purpose, the 
government divested 35 per cent of its share in PT. Telkom in 1995 and a further 11 per cent in 1999 through 
initial public offerings on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, the Surabaya Stock Exchange, the New York Stock 
Exchange and the London Stock Exchange (Sugondo and Bhinekawati, 2004).  
PT. Indosat and PT. Telkom were not totally privatized companies, but have evolved from exclusive state 
ownership into private companies with multi-ownership structures ( Nugraha, 2004). The government remained 
the majority shareholder in both companies, with more than 60 per cent of the issued capital. The Articles of 
Association of PT. Indosat and PT. Telkom established one special golden share, which provided the government 
with exclusive powers, including a veto right to block a take-over of the company and power to nominate and to 
appoint the board of directors of the companies. The golden share was designed as a new method of government 
control over privatized companies.   
                                                          
14
 These are: PT.Mobisel, PT.Natrindo Telepon Seluler, PT.Telkom, PT.Mobile-8 Telecom, PT.Bakrie Telekom.  
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Following the resignation of former President Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia experienced multiple economic 
crises. To resolve the problem, the Megawati Government decided to sell government shares in several SOEs 
including PT. Indosat. The government sold 41.94 per cent of PT. Indosat’s shares to STT (Singapore 
Technologies Telemedia) in 2002. It raised about US$ 631 million, of which most was used to reduce the budget 
deficit. This transaction, however, left the government as minority owner, while STT became the majority 
shareholder of PT. Indosat (BPAB, 2003).15 Unlike the first one, the second divestment of PT. Indosat sparked 
strong opposition from various groups ranging from university intellectuals to politicians. This seemed to be the 
most controversial privatization that had ever been conducted in Indonesia.  
Opponents argued that this divestment contravened Article 33 (2) of the Constitution of 1945 governing 
state control over strategic sectors such as telecommunications.  They claimed that this transaction had left the 
government with insufficient power to control PT. Indosat, as the government held only a minority share in that 
company. The main argument was that “state control” means state ownership, which takes the form of a 
government majority shareholding in the SOEs (Syahdeini, 2003). Laksamana Sukardi (2001), the minister for 
SOE affairs, however, contended that state ownership is just an interpretation, not the one and only interpretation 
of the term “state control”. He argued that the term had to be interpreted as the utilization (the principle of benefit), 
not the possession of strategic economic sectors. 
Furthermore, the opponents argued that the divestment had made STT not only the majority shareholder but 
also one of the main players in the provision of cellular services due to the fact that PT. Indosat through its 
subsidiary companies controlled 30 per cent of the cellular market share.  This, according to them, was very 
capable of creating monopoly practices and that violated the anti monopoly provisions stipulated in both the 
Telecommunications and Anti Monopoly and Unfair Competition Laws.  
8.  Implications for the meaning of “State Control” 
 
The Indonesian telecommunications privatization involved both divestitures and non-divestiture activities. 
According to Al-Shurman (2001), divestiture undertakings deal with selling the SOEs to the private sector, and 
non-divestiture undertakings do not necessarily lead to a transfer of ownership into private hands.  More 
importantly, this has certain implications for the meaning of “state control”, as privatization ideologically opposes 
state intervention, whilst state control entails state intervention.  
Privatization of telecommunications has been designed as an act of dismantling the state monopoly over the 
sector. By privatization, the government reduces its ownership role, but increases its regulatory function due to the 
fact that privatization creates new actors in the provision of telecommunications services – private sectors firms. In 
short, privatization changed the meaning of state control from state ownership to state regulation. 
This study found that the notion of state control, its history and ideology all pertain to the state’s 
(government) intervention or its role in the economy, particularly in relation to the strategic economic sectors. In 
its development “state control” has become a controversial term as it has been subjected to different approaches 
and applications. This is more complicated in relation to the concept of privatization. On the one hand, 
privatization entails changing the nature of state intervention or control in the economy. On the other hand, the 
concept of “state control” indicates a constitutional justification of state intervention in the economy. Both of these 
interpretations are inter-related and also opposite in nature.  
Telecommunications privatization proved that the establishment of SOEs was intended as a tool for state 
control over the strategic sector rather than a goal. On this matter, Mohammad Hatta, former first Vice President 
of the Republic of Indonesia and also known as the drafter of Article 33 of the Constitution of 1945 stated (Rice, 
1983): 
 
...state ownership was limited to certain upstream industries only (e.g. electricity and basic 
industries) while leaving the production of basic goods to the other sectors under the supervision 
of the government. 
 
Hatta stated further (Swasono and Ridjal, 1992): “....to be controlled by the government does not mean that 
the government runs enterprise through its bureaucracy. [But] the enterprises management shall be given to 
professionals who will be accountable to government”.To sum it up, state control does not necessarily mean state 
ownership. 
Another important implication is that the meaning of state control reflects the political and economic 
policies of the government in power. As mentioned above, when the government favored direct state intervention 
in the economy, state ownership and state monopoly seemed to be the “official interpretation” of the term state 
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 Since 2008, STT is no longer the majority shareholder of PT. Indosat as STT has sold out it shares to Q-Tel (Qatar Telecom). 
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control. The private sector was not allowed to take part in certain industries including telecommunications. In 
contrast, the private sector was encouraged to be involved when the government moved its economic policy from a 
direct to an indirect interpretation of state intervention. Consequently, the meaning of state control also changed.   
9. State Control after Privatization 
 
Privatization is both a political and a legal tool, which mainly aims at paradigm shift in the telecommunications 
operations from state monopoly to competition (multi-operator systems). One of the most important consequences 
of this is that privatization has led governments no longer being able to play traditional tripartite roles of owner, 
operator and regulator of telecommunications. The international experience indicates that in the wake of 
privatization, governments play more prominent roles only as policy makers and regulators. Privatization therefore 
emphasizes the state’s regulatory function.  There has been a paradigm shift of the state’s control from ownership 
to regulatory based-control – from direct into indirect state control. 
Regarding the methods of state control after privatization of telecommunications, this study has found that 
in both the international and Indonesian context, governments introduce new methods of control to ensure that all 
markets (operators) are treated fairly and equally. These methods include the creation of golden shares, the 
establishment of an independent regulatory body and the introduction of new licensing regimes.  
9.1. Golden Shares 
 
Empirical investigation shows that states are often reluctant to relinquish control of privatized companies, and this 
reluctance appears particularly strong in the so-called strategic sectors such as telecommunications. In other 
words, privatization of strategic sectors actually pertains to what writers call “sectors ineligible for privatization”. 
Hence, privatization of the sector needs a legal device to enable states to retain some degree of control over the 
strategic sectors.  
There are two main reasons for governments to adopt such a legal device; first, it is believed to be the most 
suitable means for protecting national interests. Secondly, governments also believe that this device is a form of 
protection in privatization that is acceptable to foreign investors. By adopting the golden share system, 
governments retain the power to protect national interests. As a system of protection, however, it does not harm 
the interests of new owners /private sector (Nugraha, 2004). The device confers special rights, which enable the 
government to retain its control over privatized industries (Al-Shurman, 2001). Because of the special rights the 
holder of the share possesses, the device has become popular and has been adopted by many countries undertaking 
privatization programs, including Indonesia.  
Unlike the objectives and functions of conventional shares, which emphasize commercial benefits, golden 
shares primarily play a controlling role in privatized companies. In European countries, for instance, governments 
have used golden shares as protection clauses to veto any important decision taken by the newly privatized 
enterprise. The specific national interests the golden shares are designed to protect are varied and subject to the 
national law of the country in question. However, they may be classified into three main categories: (i) industries 
“strategic” to the national economy, (ii) industries “politically sensitive” to the spheres of the economy, and (iii) 
industries of “symbolic national importance” (Baev, 1995). 
For these reasons, the Indonesian government created golden shares as a control mechanism for strategic 
sectors including telecommunications when these were privatized. The government used this device because 
conventional shares were considered an inadequate means for protecting national interests. On this matter, the 
government stated: 16 
If Company Law is deemed to provide insufficient protection, the government will consider use of a 
‘golden share’ to ensure that it is able to review certain key decisions made by the new owners. 
In this context, the golden share appeared to be designed as a legal device to accommodate the interests of 
the state (policy objectives) and new owners (commercial objectives).  Hence, it may be concluded that there is an 
interaction between the golden share and privatization. Here, the golden share is intended to be a legal requirement 
for an acceptable privatization of the strategic sectors. 
PT. Telkom and PT. Indosat have golden share clauses in their Articles of Associations. However, both of 
the privatized telecommunications companies golden shares only confer upon the government approval and 
nominating rights of board of directors. Aviliani (2006) argues that this is a strong indication that the 
government’s special shares in the companies have become “barren” golden shares. She suggests that this 
correlates with the government’s weaker bargaining position in the company as a minority shareholder. As a 
result, the government considers golden shares to be rights in the figurative sense only. If so, the government has 
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 Republic of Indonesia (1998), “Masterplan for the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises”. 
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failed to understand the essence of golden shares, which are contingent upon the government policy position rather 
than equity. 
Until now, there have been no cases that test the efficacy of golden shares in Indonesia.  However, a deeper 
analysis of its profile confirms that existing golden shares in the telecommunications sector exist only for 
appearance’s sake, and are not a functional state control mechanism by any means. Irrespective of whether golden 
shares in both companies permit the government to approve a number of their key decisions, this device has one 
serious drawback.  Golden shares in Indonesia do not grant the government the right to make policies concerning 
telecommunications for the benefit of the public. This is rather surprising given that this constitutes one of the 
main reasons why telecommunications should be controlled by the state. To make the existing golden shares a 
truly functional state control mechanism, they should be designed in such a way as to secure the public benefit and 
not harm the commercial interests of new owners, because they focuse on making policies.  
9.2. The Independent Regulatory Body: The State as a Policy Maker 
 
Privatization has also led to re-organization of the government institutions involved in the telecommunications 
sector. More specifically, it has moved the telecommunications structure from government-based supply to market 
based-supply. One of the important consequences of this is that the government’s involvement in the sector has 
focused more on its role as a policy maker. The government’s involvement in detailed management of the 
telecommunications operation may create negative impacts in the competitive market. Hence, the establishment of 
an independent regulatory body has been essential in changing the regulatory mechanism from a political to a 
professional orientation.  
To this end, the Indonesian Government established the Indonesian Telecommunications Regulatory Body 
(Indonesian: Badan Regulasi Telekomunikasi Indonesia/BRTI) in 2003 through the issuance of the Decree of the 
Ministry of Transportation No. 31/2003. The government needed to ensure an equal treatment of market 
participants and fair competition in telecommunications operations. The establishment of an independent 
regulatory body, therefore, was essential.  
The government contended that an independent regulatory body did not necessarily have to be separated 
completely from the government ministry or department. Furthermore, the government insisted that the Reference 
Paper of the WTO to which the government had made a commitment, did not specifically require that the regulator 
be separate and distinct from government ministries or departments. BRTI consists of the Telecommunications 
Regulatory Committee (henceforth referred to as the Regulatory Committee) and the Directorate General of Post 
and Telecommunications (DGPT). Hence, BRTI structurally is part of the government ministry,17 because the 
DGPT functions as a policy maker on behalf of the government. However, the BRTI is functionally separate from 
the government ministry, as the Regulatory Committee members are not public servants under the DGPT.  
The establishment of the BRTI appeared to be intended as an independent telecommunications regulatory 
body. However, some have observed that BRTI was afflicted by at least three weaknesses that may reduce its 
independence (Sugondo and Bhinekawati, 2004). These were: a lack of legitimacy; it was part of a government 
ministry and therefore lacked independence; and its source of funding.  
The establishment of BRTI has changed the Indonesian telecommunications structure from government-
based supply to market-based supply as applied in most developed market economies. Separation from state-
owned telecommunications operators increases the ability of regulators to act impartially toward all market 
participants, for example in matters involving competition policy or interconnection (Intven, 2000). In summary, 
the establishment of BRTI regardless of several drawbacks on this regulatory body has changed not only the 
Indonesian telecommunications structure but also granted the government a clearer role as policy maker. 
9.3. Licensing: State Control-Based Regulation 
 
Licensing is another legal tool to maintain state control after privatization of telecommunications. It can be used as 
a tool to implement important national priorities, be it opening the markets for equipment, services, and networks 
to immediate or gradual competition, or to preserve a monopoly for the time being so as to permit investors to 
recoup their expenditures or to continue a source of revenue for the government. 
In this vein, licensing therefore becomes a crucial policy tool for governments. Interestingly, the 
implementation of a licensing regime for a privatized telecommunications market encourages governments to 
more clearly adopt a pro-active and explicit telecommunications role. And these policy and licensing roles, 
together, form the new method of state control. 
Licensing is a key aspect of telecommunications regulation. At a basic level, a license permits a 
telecommunications provider to provide specified equipment, networks, and/or services, and often conditions that 
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 Ministry of Communication and Information. 
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology   Vol. 5, Issue 2 (2010)  
70 
 
permission on certain requirements. Licensing, however, can control market entry and, therefore, can be used to 
shape the market by limiting the number of players or the types of services that they are able to provide. It can 
create legal certainty for new entrants in markets where the telecommunications regulatory regime or general legal 
framework is not comprehensive or where there is not much history with telecommunications regulation. Under 
these circumstances, conditions imposed and rights accorded in license can serve as a substitute for such 
frameworks (Walden and Angel, 2005).  
As a binding contract, a license can guarantee exclusivity or ensure due process as well as impose 
performance obligations, e.g. in the form of enhanced market penetration or network roll-out requirements. 
Without the performance obligations, countries might be unwilling to involve private parties in the running of the 
state-owned incumbent. Licensing can also be used as a tool to create competitive markets by imposing 
obligations on incumbents in order to level the playing field (Walden and Angel, 2005). 
After privatizing and liberalizing the telecommunications sector, SOEs are not the sole provider of 
telecommunications. As a result, the regulatory framework should move from protecting the incumbent’s 
monopoly to enhancing competition. In this context, the state is no longer able to employ a direct control in the 
form of establishing SOEs as the sole provider of telecommunication (state ownership). After privatization, the 
state has little choice but to employ an indirect control in the form of establishing a regulatory framework with a 
competitive orientation. To this end, establishing a licensing regime is essential. This enables the state to control 
markets by specifying the rights and obligations of operators, and provides investors with some certainty as to the 
business in which they are investing. The license provides all stakeholders, including consumers, competitors and 
the government with a clear understanding of what the operator is and is not permitted or required to do. 
Indonesia should take a clear position regarding the state role should play after privatization. The author 
suggests that the government should focus on the policy making function while the regulatory function including 
licensing should be transferred completely to the Telecommunications Regulatory Body (BRTI). In addition, 
Indonesia should consider establishing a new licensing regime that technology neutral in nature. This is to ensure 
that it does not go out of date when new technology is used to provide the same service. Furthermore, Indonesia 
should consider adopting a general authorization or class license approach as applied in the UK, except for the use 
of scarce resources. This will invite more operators to be involved in the provision of telecommunications services 
and thereby provide more choices to consumers. More importantly, the removal of licensing procedures may 
substantially reduce the level of corruption in the bureaucracy.  
10. Concluding Remarks 
 
Privatization, state control and telecommunications industry are the three main themes investigated by this paper 
in the context of Indonesia. Privatization and telecommunications industry have been interacting since the 1980s 
and state control in the sense of government involvement in the sector has been a central issue. 
Telecommunications is one sector historically subject to state monopolies in both developed and developing 
countries for many reasons. The Indonesian legislation stipulates that the telecommunications sector is of national 
strategic importance and must therefore be controlled by the state. Not surprisingly, the Indonesian government 
has tended to interpret the term “state control” as state or government ownership. The privatization of the 
Indonesian telecommunications industry, therefore, raises a critical question; in what ways might the government 
maintain its control over the sector when privatization reduces state ownership in SOEs? 
In the telecommunications sector, privatization has been as policy response to the shortcomings and the 
failures of the etatist traditional telecommunications regime in providing services efficiently and in adjusting to 
rapid technological advances in telecommunications.   Privatization is both a political and a legal tool, which 
mainly aims at paradigm shift in the telecommunications operations from state monopoly to competition (multi-
operator systems).  
This study argues that the term state control should be understood as a constitutional mandate to the state to 
make economic policies with the main purpose of utilizing the strategic economic sectors for the greatest benefit 
of the people. The state nonetheless has the right to choose the appropriate means of control for achieving such a 
purpose. In this context, the privatization program is not only constitutionally acceptable but also implies a method 
of control, which the government believes is able to respond to socio-economic development at both national and 
international level.  
Regarding the methods of state control after privatization of telecommunications, this study has found that 
in both the international and Indonesian context, governments introduce new methods of control to ensure that all 
markets (operators) are treated fairly and equally. These methods include the creation of golden shares, the 
establishment of an independent regulatory body and the introduction of new licensing regimes. Together, these 
aim to reduce monopoly and enhance competition. In summary, by privatization, there has been a paradigm shift 
of the state’s control from ownership to regulatory based-control. 
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